The Square Peg Between two Round Holes: Why California\u27s Traditional Right to Control Test is not Relevant for On-Demand Workers by Tucciarello, Catherine
  351
 
THE SQUARE PEG BETWEEN TWO ROUND 
HOLES: WHY CALIFORNIA’S TRADITIONAL 
RIGHT TO CONTROL TEST IS NOT RELEVANT 
FOR ON-DEMAND WORKERS 
Catherine Tucciarello* 
I. INTRODUCTION............................................................. 352 
II. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF EMPLOYEE 
MISCLASSIFICATION........................................................... 354 
A. Classifying Worker Status ........................................... 354 
a. Why Do Employers Misclassify? ............................. 354 
b. Common Law Test .................................................... 355 
c. The “ABC” Test ........................................................ 356 
d. The IRS Test .............................................................. 356 
e. Economic Realities Test ............................................ 358 
B. A New Era of Employee Misclassification Cases ....... 358 
a. Shift to an “On Demand Economy” ........................ 358 
b. A New Dilemma ......................................................... 360 
c. California’s Employee Friendly Laws .................... 360 
d. The Borello Decision ................................................. 361 
e. The Alexander Decision ............................................ 363 
III. NEW BUSINESS MODEL, SAME OLD TEST ............ 365 
A. What is Control?: Disparities Between Alexander and 
Emerging On-Demand Cases ............................................... 365 
                                                                                                             
 *  J.D. Seton Hall University School of Law, 2017; B.A. Villanova University. I would 
like to thank the Circuit Review Editorial Board for all of the hard work helping me to 
perfect this comment, my faculty mentor Dean Charles Sullivan for his wisdom and 
guidance, and my family for their endless support. I hope you are proud, Dad. 
352 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 13:351 
B. Why Traditional Classifications Under Borello Do Not 
Work For Uber And Lyft ..................................................... 367 
C.    Creating a New Classification: A Hybrid Employee and 
Independent Contractor ....................................................... 369 
IV.   CONCLUSION ................................................................. 373 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“What’s in a name? that which we call a rose// By any other name 
would smell as sweet.”1  The idea that a name is artificial and meaningless 
seems enchanting with respect to Romeo and Juliet’s star-crossed 
romance.  However, in today’s complicated and evolving workforce, 
where courts face the difficult challenge of differentiating employees from 
independent contractors a name actually has particular force.  While an 
employer may use one label for a worker, it is the job of the courts to look 
past the label and ensure a worker is properly classified.  The classification 
of a worker as an employee or independent contractor has significance for 
both parties.  If a worker is labeled as an employee, an employer must 
provide statutorily required income among other benefits.  Therefore, an 
employer can avoid substantial costs by characterizing a worker as an 
independent contractor.  Currently there is no standardized test that 
provides guidance to courts for distinguishing employees from 
independent contractors.  Rather different agencies and jurisdictions use 
different tests.  This variation leaves courts with the challenge of applying 
the different factors of varying tests to aspects of a business’s policies and 
procedures that will definitively classify a worker as an independent 
contractor or an employer. 
Today we have emerging new business models in which 
classification of workers is critical to the success of the company’s model, 
yet classifying workers in these new models poses a challenge because of 
their non-traditional nature.  California, a traditionally employee-friendly 
state, is considering the classification issue of two rising on-demand 
companies, Uber and Lyft.  In March 2015, two district court judges in the 
Northern District of California denied summary judgment to both 
companies, leaving the question of whether drivers were employees or 
independent contractors to a jury.2  Both courts applied the California right 
to control test for determining if a worker is an employee or independent 
                                                                                                             
 1 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET, act 2, sc. 2. 
 2 Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2015); O’Connor v. Uber 
Techs., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
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contractor, which was developed in S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of 
Industrial Relations.3 
The Ninth Circuit is no stranger to shaking up the independent 
contractor business model.  In 2014, it ruled in Alexander v. FedEx4 that 
FedEx drivers were employees, despite the fact that FedEx labeled them 
as independent contractors.  Alexander also applied California’s right to 
control test, and found that the underlying employment relationship 
between FedEx and its drivers was clear and unambiguous because of 
FedEx’s control over its drivers’ appearance, vehicles, work hours, and 
means of delivering packages.5  However, the Uber and Lyft business 
models, which attract workers based on the ability of the driver to achieve 
flexibility in schedule and productivity, do not provide such an obvious 
answer to the classification question.  Up to this point, the Borello factors 
have been applied to an economic model vastly different from the quickly 
evolving on-demand economy.6  That means that, if a court were to use 
the same test that found FedEx drivers were employees and applied it to 
Uber and Lyft’s relationship with its drivers, they may also be found to be 
employees.  As an alternative, this Article considers the possibility that 
Uber and Lyft drivers fall into a new category of employment, one that has 
not been considered among the traditional work relationships.  First, the 
Article lays out the different tests various branches of state and federal 
government use to classify workers.  Next, the Article will focus on the 
Ninth Circuit’s case law and outline the history of the employment 
misclassification test formed in Borello and applied in Alexander.  Then, 
the Article will turn towards the employee misclassification cases in 
California involving Uber and Lyft.  The Article will contrast the on-
demand business models analyzed in these cases with FedEx’s business 
model.  Finally, the Article will propose a new classification of workers 
that will make room for emerging on-demand business models—the 
square peg between two round holes. 
                                                                                                             
 3 S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Industrial Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 404 (Cal. 
1989). 
 4 Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 981, 984 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 5 Id. at 990. 
 6 Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1081. 
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II. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF EMPLOYEE 
MISCLASSIFICATION 
A. Classifying Worker Status 
a. Why Do Employers Misclassify? 
Under a traditional understanding of employment, employees were 
“individuals hired on a permanent or full-time basis or part-time basis with 
an understanding of continuous employment”7 and independent 
contractors were “individuals who lack[ed] a contract for long term 
employment and whose minimum hours may vary at random.”8  However, 
this traditional understanding has been complicated by the different factors 
and balancing tests used by different government agencies and states to 
determine if a worker is an independent contractor or an employee.9  The 
complications arising from the numerous tests cause some employers to 
misclassify their workers out of genuine error.  However, many employers 
intentionally misclassify because of the financial benefits they gain from 
labeling workers as independent contractors.10  If an employer classifies a 
worker as an employee, federal and state laws require employers to pay 
that employee at least minimum wage and overtime; refrain from 
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, and other personal characteristics; 
maintain safe and healthy workplaces; contribute toward payroll taxes that 
go towards the employee’s unemployment insurance; provide Social 
Security, Disability Insurance and Medicare; provide workers’ 
compensation insurance; and, in many employers’ cases, provide 
healthcare.11  The laws that afford protections to a worker classified as an 
employee place an expensive burden on the employer.  By mislabeling and 
classifying workers as independent contractors, employers can avoid the 
expenses of having a traditional employee. 
Another benefit employers receive from misclassifying workers as 
independent contractors is escaping vicarious liability.  Under that theory, 
an employer is liable, for the negligent acts of its employee, as long as the 
                                                                                                             
 7 Karen R. Harned, Georgina M. Kryda & Elizabeth A. Milito, Creating A Workable 
Legal Standard For Defining An Independent Contractor, 4 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & 
L. 93, 95 (2010). 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. at 99. 
 10 Ruth Burdick, Principles of Agency Permit the NLRB to Consider Additional 
Factors of Entrepreneurial Independence and the Relative Dependence of Employees 
When Determining Independent Contractor Status Under Section 2(3), 15 HOFSTRA LAB. 
& EMP. L.J. 75, 76 (1997). 
 11 Seth D. Harris and Alan B. Krueger, A Proposal for Modernizing Labor Laws for 
Twenty-First-Century Work: “The Independent Worker”, in THE HAMILTON PROJECT, 7 
(2015). 
2017] The Square Peg Between Two Round Holes 355 
acts were committed in the course and scope of the employment.12  If an 
employer retains a worker as an independent contractor, however, the 
employer cannot be held responsible.13 
b. Common Law Test 
Under the common law, an agency test is used to determine whether 
an individual is classified as an employee or an independent contractor for 
purpose of figuring out when an employer is vicariously liable for the 
tortious acts of its agents.14  The Restatement (Second) of Agency, 
balances these factors to determine the type of relationship that exists: 
(1) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may 
exercise over the details of the work; 
(2) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct 
occupation or business; 
(3) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether in the 
locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the 
employer or by a specialist without supervision; 
(4) the skill required in the particular occupation; 
(5) whether the employer or the workman supplies the 
instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing 
the work; 
(6) the length of time for which the person is employed; 
(7) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; 
(8) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the 
employer; 
(9) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation 
of master and servant; and 
(10) whether the principal is or is not in business.15 
These factors are weighed and balanced against each other.  It is not 
necessary that each factor is met, and the main focus of the test is whether 
an employer retains the right to control the manner and means by which 
the product is accomplished.16 
                                                                                                             
 12 Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 756 (1998). 
 13 Id. 
 14 Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, Rethinking the Worker Classification Test: Employees, 
Entrepreneurship, and Empowerment, 34 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 67, 76 (2013). 
 15 Restatement (Second) of Agency§ 220 (2)(a)–(j) (1958). See also Nationwide Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323–24. 
 16 Cmty. for Creative Non- Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-52 (1989). 
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c. The “ABC” Test 
The “ABC” Test is used by many states to determine an employer’s 
obligation to pay unemployment taxes.17  Under this test, to be considered 
an independent contractor, a worker must meet three requirements: (a) the 
worker is free from control or direction in the performance of the work; 
(b) the work is done outside the usual course of the company’s business 
and is done off the premises of the business; and (c) the worker is 
customarily engaged in an independent trade, occupation, profession, or 
business.18  This test is broad and results in most workers being classified 
as employees.19  It creates a presumption of employment, which makes it 
harder for employers to escape financial and legal obligations through 
intentional classification.20 
d. The IRS Test 
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) created a twenty-factor test to 
determine whether a worker is an employee or independent contractor for 
purposes of withholding taxes.21  An employer is responsible for 
withholding income taxes, withholding and paying Social Security and 
Medicare taxes, and paying unemployment taxes on wages to employees.22  
Employers do not pay these taxes for independent contractors, which is 
another incentive to classify workers as such.23  The IRS grouped the 
twenty-factors that determine the degree of control and independence an 
employer holds over a worker into three categories: (1) Behavioral: Does 
the company control or have the right to control what the worker does and 
how the worker does his or her job?;24  (2) Financial: Are the business 
                                                                                                             
 17 Karen R. Harned, Georgina M. Kryda & Elizabeth A. Milito, Creating A Workable 
Legal Standard For Defining An Independent Contractor, 4 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & 
L. 93, 102 (2010). 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Independent Contractor (Self-Employed) or Employee?, INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERVICE,http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Independent
-Contractor-Self-Employed-or-Employee (last updated Apr. 18, 2017). 
 22 Understanding Employment Taxes, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, https://www.irs.
gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/understanding-employment-taxes (last 
updated Dec. 14, 2016). 
 23 Id. 
 24 Behavioral Control, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, https://www.irs.gov/
businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/behavioral-control (last updated Oct. 4, 2016).  
(1) Instructions: If the employer directs where, when, or how work is done, the worker is 
likely an employee.  This is similar to the right-of-control common law test; (2) Training: 
If the employer provides training so that the worker performs in a particular manner and 
with a particular result, the worker is likely an employee.  This is especially true if the 
training is provided at regular intervals; (3) Order or sequence: If the employer requires the 
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aspects of the worker’s job controlled by the payer?;25 and (3) Type of 
Relationship: Are there written contracts or employee type benefits?26  
Will the relationship continue and is the work performed a key aspect of 
                                                                                                             
worker to perform his tasks in a particular order or sequence, or retains the right to establish 
a particular order or sequence, the worker is likely an employee; (4) Assistance: If the 
employer hires, supervises, and pays assistants to aid the worker, the worker is likely an 
employee; (5) Furnishing of tools and materials: If the employer provides the supplies, 
materials, equipment, and other tools necessary to perform the work, the worker is an 
employee dependent on his employer; (6) Oral or written reports: If the employer requires 
the worker to submit reports at regular intervals, the worker is likely an employee; (7) 
Payment: If the employer pays the worker by salary or by hour, week, or month, the worker 
is likely an employee. If the worker is paid when he or she bills for services performed, or 
is paid on commission, the worker is likely an independent contractor; (8) Doing work on 
employer’s premises: If the employer requires the worker to perform his/her services on 
the premises, where the employer can have control over the worker, the worker is likely an 
employee; (9) Set hours of work: If the employer requires the worker to perform a set 
number of work hours, sets the worker’s schedule, or retains approval rights over the 
worker’s schedule, the worker is likely an employee.  If the employer does not approve the 
worker’s schedule, the worker is likely an independent contractor.; (10) Full time required: 
If the employer requires the worker to work on a full-time basis, the worker is likely an 
employee.; (11) Working for more than one firm at a time: If the employer does not allow 
the worker to perform work for another firm so long as it is performing work for the 
employer’s firm, the worker is likely an employee.  However, a worker can be an employee 
of multiple firms at the same time. (12) Making services available to the public: If the 
employer does not allow the worker to perform his work for the public as a free service, 
the worker is likely an employee. 
 25 Financial Control, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/
small-businesses-self-employed/financial-control (last updated Oct. 4, 2016). (13) 
Significant monetary investment: If the worker must make a significant monetary 
investment in order to perform his services, he is independent of the employer and is not 
an employee.  There is no set dollar limit that qualifies as a “significant investment”; it is 
determined on a case-by-case basis.; (14) Payment of business and/or traveling expenses: 
If the worker must expend money for business or business-related travel, and the employer 
pays these expenses, the worker is likely an employee.  In this case, the employer generally 
has the ability to control the extent of the employee’s business or travel expenses.; (15) 
Realization of profit or loss: If the worker does not have the opportunity to profit (or loss) 
from his work, he is an employee.  The employer is in the capacity of receiving the money 
directly from the client and has the opportunity for profit or loss. 
 26 Type of Relationship, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, https://www.irs.gov/businesses
/small-businesses-self-employed/type-of-relationship (last updated Oct. 4, 2016).  (16) 
Services rendered personally: If the worker must perform the work personally, and cannot 
delegate the tasks, he/she is an employee; (17) Integration: If the employer uses the worker 
as part of the course of normal business operations, the worker is likely an employee.  In 
this case, the success of the business may be directly related to the success of the individual 
employee; (18) Continuing relationship: If the employer and the worker have a 
longstanding, continuing relationship, the worker is likely an employee.  This includes 
work that is done at recurring intervals or services performed by a worker who is “on call.”; 
(19) Right to discharge: If the employer may fire or dismiss the worker, the worker is likely 
an employee.; (20) Right to terminate: If the worker can terminate the work relationship 
and not be liable for completion of a particular job or service, the worker is likely an 
employee.  If the worker remains liable for a job or service, he or she is an independent 
contractor. 
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the business?27  The IRS asserts that no single factor is dispositive of 
classification, and that businesses must weigh all the factors in relation to 
the relationship. 
e. Economic Realities Test 
Courts use the economic reality test to determine coverage and 
compliance with the minimum wage and overtime requirements of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act.28  The economic realities test, like the common law 
right to control test, takes into account the degree of control an employer 
has over his or her employee, but it also considers the degree to which the 
workers are economically dependent on the business.29  Under the 
economic realities test, courts look at six factors: 
(1) the degree of control exerted by the alleged employer over the 
worker; (2) the worker’s opportunity for profit or loss; (3) the 
worker’s investment in the business; (4) the permanence of the 
working relationship; (5) the degree of skill required to perform 
the work; and (6) the extent to which the work is an integral part 
of the alleged employer’s business.30 
Courts must look at the totality of the circumstances rather than one 
single factor.31 
B. A New Era of Employee Misclassification Cases 
a. Shift to an “On Demand Economy” 
A few years ago, no one knew about Uber32 or Lyft33 and few could 
imagine technology that would allow for-profit ride sharing in a stranger’s 
                                                                                                             
 27 Pivateau, supra note 14, at 88–89. 
 28 See Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985). 
 29 See Baker v. Flint Eng’g & Constr. Co., 137 F.3d 1436, 1440 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 30 Id. 
 31 See id. 
 32 “Uber Technologies, Inc. provides a smartphone application that connects drivers 
with people who need a ride. The company’s application enables users to arrange and 
schedule transportation and/or logistics services with third party providers. Uber 
Technologies services customers in North, Central, and South Americas, as well as Europe, 
the Middle East, Africa and the Asia Pacific . . . . [T]he company was founded in 2009 and 
based in San Francisco, California.” Company Overview of Uber Technologies, Inc., 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (May 19, 2017, 11:54 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=144524848. 
 33 “Lyft Inc. helps commuters to share rides with friends, classmates, and coworkers 
going the same way. It helps organizations to establish private and social networks for 
ridesharing. The company focuses on college, university, and corporate communities . . . . 
[T]he company was founded in 2007 and is based in San Francisco, California. Lyft Inc. 
operates as a subsidiary of Enterprise Holdings, Inc.” Company Overview of Lyft Inc., 
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personal vehicle.  Now, these platforms have become well-recognized 
businesses that connect sellers and buyers of fast and cheap transportation.  
Uber and Lyft’s business models revolve around smart-phone apps that 
connect drivers offering rides to passengers who seek them.34  Customers 
are able to pay through the app, rather than directly to the driver.35  The 
passengers pay a mileage-based fee through credit cards that the 
companies keep on file.36  Uber and Lyft take a percentage of the fee and 
give the rest to the drivers.37  The passengers input their location and 
destination, and the app informs the customer when the driver has 
arrived.38  The app shows customers the route the driver takes, the 
estimated time of arrival, and the identity of the driver.39  After the 
transaction is complete, the passenger rates the driver.40  Central to Uber 
and Lyft’s business model is the classification of drivers as independent 
contractors, and itself as a technological platform to connect those drivers 
with passengers. 
These types of business models have given rise to the “on demand 
economy,” which is “the economic activity created by technology 
companies that fulfill consumer demand via the immediate provisioning 
of goods and services.” 41  The theory behind this business model is that 
access to goods and skills is more important than ownership of them.42  It 
is creating a marketplace for efficient exchange: an entire economy is 
being formed around the exchange of goods and services between 
individuals instead of directly from business to consumer.43  “This new 
class of on-demand companies relies on a large freelance workforce 
instead of on a classic company workforce.” 44  Companies in the on-
demand economy hire workers to perform the services the companies 
offer.  The on-demand economy is breaking down the traditional 
                                                                                                             
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (May 19, 2017, 11:54 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/research/
stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=58995029. 
 34 Brishen Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber, 82 U CHI L REV DIALOGUE 85, 86 (2015). 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Rogers, supra note 34, at 97. 
 41 Mike Jaconi, The ‘On-Demand Economy’ Is Revolutionizing Consumer Behavior-
Here’s How, BUSINESS INSIDER, (July 13, 2014, 4:52 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com
/the-on-demand-economy-2014-7. 
 42 Danielle Sacks, The Sharing Economy, FAST COMPANY (Apr. 18 2011), 
http://www.fastcompany.com/1747551/ sharing-economy. 
 43 Irving Wladawasky-Berger, The Continuing Evolution of the On-Demand Economy, 
THE CIO REPORT (July 24, 2015 12:25 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2015/07/24/the-
continuing-evolution-of-the-on-demand-economy/. 
 44 Id. 
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employment structure in favor of jobs that are more flexible and 
temporary. 
b. A New Dilemma 
Recently, two separate decisions in California district courts 
involving wage and hour suits brought by drivers for Uber and Lyft, have 
shaken the independent contractor business model the ride-sharing 
companies rely on.  Two judges denied Uber and Lyft’s motion for 
summary judgment that would have classified the drivers as independent 
contractors, and instead established a rebuttable presumption that the 
drivers were employees because they performed services for the 
company’s benefit.45  Both judges found that material facts remain 
disputed, and in light of this, the on-demand car services will need to make 
their cases to the juries as to why their drivers should not be classified as 
employees under the California Labor Code.46 
In both cases, the courts relied on the right to control test adopted in 
the California Supreme Court case S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. 
Department of Industrial Relations.47  In addition, both courts relied on a 
Ninth Circuit wage and hour case, Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package 
Sys., in which FedEx drivers alleged that FedEx had misclassified its 
drivers as independent contractors, which entitled the drivers to unpaid 
wages and expenses.48  The court found that the California FedEx drivers 
were misclassified as independent contractors under the California right to 
control test.49  The Alexander decision seems to be a catalyst for lawsuits 
against emerging on-demand companies Uber and Lyft, which similarly 
rely on independent contractors for the success of their business.  
However, Uber and Lyft’s relationships with their drivers are far more 
complicated and inconclusive than FedEx’s relationship with its drivers. 
c. California’s Employee Friendly Laws 
California law provides employees with many benefits and 
protections, while independent contractors are afforded almost none:50 
Employees are generally entitled to, among other things, minimum 
wage and overtime pay, meal and rest breaks, reimbursement for 
work-related expenses, workers’ compensation, and employer 
                                                                                                             
 45 See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015); see also Cotter 
v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 46 Id. 
 47 769 P.2d 399, 404 (Cal. 1989). 
 48 765 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 49 Id. 
 50 Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1074. 
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contributions to unemployment insurance.  Employers are also 
required under California Unemployment Insurance Code to 
withhold and remit to the state their employees’ state income tax 
payments.51 
California provides employees with these protections to ensure that 
employers do not exploit employees due to the inequality in bargaining 
power.52  The California legislature does not provide the same protections 
to independent contractors because their independent status presumably 
affords them more bargaining power against companies.53  Independent 
contractors can “take their services and equipment elsewhere when faced 
with unfair or arbitrary treatment, or unfavorable working conditions.”54  
Further, they often are working for more than one company at a time, and, 
therefore, are not “dependent on a single employer in the same all-or-
nothing fashion as traditional employees who tend to work on a full-time 
basis for an indefinite term.”55  Past decisions in California have 
demonstrated that the statutory provisions aimed at employees should be 
liberally construed in favor of protecting the employees and implementing 
the legislature’s intent.56 
d. The Borello Decision 
In Borello, the California Supreme Court examined whether 
agricultural laborers hired to harvest cucumbers under a written “share-
farmer” agreement were independent contractors exempt from workers’ 
compensation coverage under the California Labor Code.57  The deputy 
labor commissioner issued a stop order against a grower for failure to 
secure worker’s compensation coverage for laborers.58  The grower argued 
that the workers were seasonal agricultural laborers that harvested 
cucumbers working under a share-farmer agreement, meaning they were 
tenant farmers who received a share of the profits.59  Therefore, the grower 
argued that the farmers were only seasonal, temporary workers, and should 
be considered independent contractors.60 
                                                                                                             
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 55 Id. 
 56 Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1075. 
 57 S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Industrial Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 400 (Cal. 
1989). 
 58 Id. at 401. 
 59 Id. at 402. 
 60 Id. 
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Following the common law’s vicarious liability tradition, the court 
held that, “[t]he principal test of an employment relationship is whether 
the person to whom service is rendered has the right to control the manner 
and means of accomplishing the result desired.” 61  The court noted that 
the factor of control is often inapplicable to a variety of employment 
relationships when applied in isolation.62  Therefore, the court concluded 
that, although the right to control the work details is the most important 
consideration, the court also “endorse[ed] several ‘secondary’ indicia of 
the nature of a service relationship.”63  The court identified the right to 
discharge at will without cause, as strong evidence in support of an 
employment relationship.64  Further, the court identified additional factors, 
which are all interrelated elements to finding an employment relationship, 
rather than separate tests: 
(1) whether the one performing the services is engaged in a distinct 
occupation or business; (2) the kind of occupation, with reference 
to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the 
direction of the principal or by a specialist without supervision; (3) 
The skill required in the particular occupation; (4) Whether the 
principal or the worker supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and 
the place of work for the person doing the work; (5) The length of 
time for which the services are to be performed; (6) The method 
of payment, whether by the time or by the job; (7) Whether or not 
the work is a part of the regular business of the principal; and (8) 
Whether or not the parties believe they are creating employer-
employee relationship. 65 
Ultimately, the court held that the share-farmers were employees and 
were entitled to compensation coverage.66  The grower argued that the 
share-farmers managed their own labor, shared in the profit or loss, 
performed a job that required specific skill and judgment, and signed an 
agreement in which they expressly agreed that the parties’ relationship was 
principal-independent contractor.67  However, the court found that the 
grower exercised “pervasive control over the operation as a whole.”68  The 
grower owned and cultivated the land for his own account, made the 
decision to grow cucumbers, supplied the materials and transportation, and 
                                                                                                             
 61 Id. at 404. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Borello, 769 P.2d at 404. 
 64 It should be noted that this factor is unique to California’s right to control test. 
 65 Borello, 769 P.2d at 404. 
 66 Id. at 410. 
 67 Id. at 407–10. 
 68 Id. at 408. 
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controlled workers’ documentation for production and payment.69  The 
court held that, “[a] business entity may not avoid its statutory obligations 
by carving up its production process into minute steps, then asserting that 
it lacks control over the exact means by which one such step is performed 
by the responsible workers.”70  Under the test the court had adopted, the 
grower maintained all necessary control over the process.71 
e. The Alexander Decision 
The Ninth Circuit reversed a ruling by the Multidistrict Litigation 
Court, which granted summary judgment in favor of FedEx in a class 
action alleging that FedEx drivers in California were employees rather 
than independent contractors.72  Instead, the Ninth Circuit held that the 
amount of control FedEx exhibited over its drivers weighed in favor of 
finding an employment relationship.73  The court applied the right to 
control test adopted in Borello.74  The Ninth Circuit found that “FedEx’s 
policies and procedures unambiguously allow FedEx to exercise a great 
deal of control over the manner in which its drivers do their jobs.”75  FedEx 
maintained control through its detailed appearance requirements for the 
drivers and their vehicles.76  FedEx also controlled the time its drivers can 
work by adjusting workloads so that they were forced to work nine and a 
half to eleven hours a day.77  The court found that FedEx controlled how 
and when drivers delivered packages.78  The court rejected the crux of 
FedEx’s argument, that it only controls the results of the work and that 
there were details of the driver’s work it did not control.79  The court noted 
that having absolute control is not necessary for workers to be considered 
employees under the right to control test.80 
The Court found that the secondary factors of the right to control test 
did not sufficiently favor FedEx to permit it to classify its drivers as 
independent contractors.81  First, the right to terminate at will is strong 
evidence of employee status.82  Further, there were factors that weighed in 
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FedEx’s favor such as their operating agreement that contained an 
arbitration clause,83  and the provisions pertaining to tools and 
equipment.84  However, the court found that, even though plaintiffs 
provided their own trucks and were not required to obtain equipment from 
FedEx, the majority of the drivers did so.85  The final factor that favored 
FedEx was the parties’ agreement that they were creating an independent 
contractor relationship.86  The operating agreement identified the 
relationship as an independent contractor; however the court found that 
this factor was not dispositive or controlling if, as a matter of law, a 
different type of employment relationship exists.87  “What matters is what 
the contract, in actual effect, allows or requires.”88  After examining 
FedEx’s policies and procedures, the court concluded that the drivers were 
employees, rather than independent contractors.89 
In this holding, the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected the 
“entrepreneurial test” that had been adopted by the District of Columbia 
Circuit for classifying employment status.90  Under the entrepreneurial 
test, the emphasis is shifted away from control, and the primary factor is 
whether the worker has significant opportunity for gain or loss.91  FedEx 
relied on the D.C. Circuit decision to argue that the drivers had the 
opportunity under the operating agreement to delegate to other drivers, 
take on additional routes, or sell routes to third parties.92  However, the 
court held that these entrepreneurial opportunities that FedEx provides 
drivers are limited because FedEx ultimately has final control, for 
example, FedEx may refuse to let a driver take on additional routes or sell 
his route.93  The court held that, regardless, the entrepreneurial test had no 
application to the case: “There is no indication that California has replaced 
its longstanding right-to-control test with the new entrepreneurial-
opportunities test developed by the D.C. Circuit.”94 
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III. NEW BUSINESS MODEL, SAME OLD TEST 
The California right to control test, when applied to the facts in 
Alexander, led the court to the conclusion that the workers were 
employees.  Though FedEx contracted with the drivers as independent 
contractors, most aspects of FedEx’s relationship with its drivers looked 
like a traditional employer/employee relationship.95  However, worker 
relationships in emerging business models, such as Uber and Lyft, do not 
neatly fit into the traditional independent contractor-employee dichotomy.  
The Borello test has consistently been applied to result in either 
independent contractor or employee status.  In Cotter and O’Connor, both 
judges recognize a new, unclassified relationship between worker and 
company. 
A. What is Control?: Disparities Between Alexander and Emerging On-
Demand Cases 
The court in Cotter examined whether Lyft drivers should be 
considered employees or independent contractors under California law.96  
The court denied cross-motions for summary judgment, and found that the 
issue presented a mixed question of law and fact that should be resolved 
by a jury.97  The court in O’Connor reviewed a similar matter involving 
the classification of Uber drivers.98  The court denied defendant’s motion 
for summary judgment, leaving a jury to resolve the matter.99  In 
Alexander, even though FedEx cloaked its drivers as independent 
contractors, the Ninth Circuit found that FedEx drivers were employees as 
a matter of law because “the arrow pointed so strongly in the direction of 
one status or another that no reasonable juror could have pointed the arrow 
in an opposite direction after applying California’s multi-factor test.”100  
The courts in both ride-share cases acknowledged that the Borello right to 
control test does not produce such a conclusive result when applied to 
Uber and Lyft drivers.  The court in O’Connor noted that “numerous 
factors point in opposing directions.”101  The court in Cotter recognized 
that “[a]t first glance, Lyft drivers don’t seem much like employees . . . . 
But Lyft drivers don’t seem much like independent contractors either.”102 
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In Cotter, the parties disagreed about the amount of control Lyft 
exercises over its drivers.  The court acknowledged that Lyft maintains a 
good deal of control over how drivers proceed after they accept ride 
requests.103  Lyft provides a driver with instructions on what not to do on 
the job.104  Also, Lyft reserves the right to penalize or terminate drivers 
who violate company policy.105  Lyft maintains quality control over its 
drivers through a rating system, and any driver who falls below a certain 
threshold is subject to termination.106  However, the court also recognized 
that the Lyft drivers “enjoy great flexibility in when and how often to 
work—far more flexibility than the typical employee.”107  The court noted 
that there was no overwhelming evidence of an employment relationship, 
as in Alexander.108  The court further pointed out, “[t]he experience of the 
Lyft driver is much different from the experience of the FedEx driver, 
underscoring why the plaintiffs have not established here that summary 
judgment should be granted in their favor.”109 
In O’Connor, the court recognized that many factors of control were 
disputed and ambiguous in Uber’s relationship with its drivers.110  First, 
the court pointed out that there was a dispute over whether a driver can be 
terminated at will.111  Plaintiffs claimed that Uber might fire drivers at any 
time for any reason, which would be strong evidence of an employment 
relationship.112  However, Uber pointed out that before it terminates 
drivers it must give notice or there must be a material breach in the driver 
agreement.113  Uber uses a customer rating system as a form of quality 
control, similar to the rating system Lyft uses.114  The court pointed to 
evidence that, if a driver’s star rating falls below the minimum star rating, 
Uber terminates the driver.115  The court noted that the customer rating 
system is a form of control used by Uber to “constantly monitor certain 
aspects of a driver’s behavior,” and that a jury could find it weighs in favor 
of finding an employment relationship.116  The court noted that the fact 
that Uber has no control over its drivers’ hours and when they report for 
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work significantly weighs in favor of independent contractor status.117  
However, the court pointed out that “[t]he more relevant inquiry is how 
much control Uber has over their drivers while they are on duty for 
Uber.”118  The court in O’Connor noted that there were many factors of 
the Borello test that pointed in different directions, including those 
involving Uber’s level of control over the manner and means of 
performance.119 
B. Why Traditional Classifications Under Borello Do Not Work For 
Uber And Lyft 
The courts in O’Connor and Cotter were faced with the task of 
applying traditional common law principles encompassed in the Borello 
right to control test, to technological platforms that operate from a 
smartphone.  The independent contractor model of the emerging on-
demand companies becomes the “Wild West”120 of classification: “The 
test the California courts have developed over the 20th Century for 
classifying workers isn’t very helpful in addressing this 21st Century 
problem.  Some factors point in one direction, some point in the other, and 
some are ambiguous.”121  It is true that the factors of the Borello test can 
sometimes produce different outcomes even when applied to many old 
economy jobs, depending on how a court interprets the facts of the case or 
weighs a specific factor.  However, the business models of Uber and Lyft 
do not look anything like old economy jobs.  From an economic and 
societal perspective, the technology Uber and Lyft provide creates exciting 
and new opportunities for workers.  It seems critical to tread through the 
legal uncertainty and define the employment relationship between 
Uber/Lyft and the driver to protect drivers from employer exploitation. 
The core test of an employment relationship under the Borello test is 
“whether the person to whom service is rendered has the right to control 
the manner and means of accomplishing the result desired.”122  The court 
in O’Connor recognized that the Borello test “evolved under an economic 
model very different from the new sharing economy.”123  Companies 
employed workers to provide services for the companies’ own benefit.  
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There was a traditional and more direct connection between the worker 
and the business.  Whether an individual was an independent contractor or 
employee depended on how much control that business had over that 
worker.  However, the Uber and Lyft business models diverge from the 
traditional forms of employment and present challenges to the application 
of the Borello test. 
The relationships Uber and Lyft maintain with drivers do not neatly 
result in classification under the Borello test.  Like an independent 
contractor, drivers are given freedom to work for different employers; they 
are not economically dependent on the ride-share services for their main 
source of income.  The drivers have flexibility in their work hours and 
where they work.124  The drivers use their own cars for each ride.125  
Drivers also control acceptance of rides, and therefore are in control of 
their own opportunity for profit or loss.126  Contrastingly, like traditional 
employees, the drivers are integral to the companies’ businesses.  Uber 
and Lyft maintain control over pricing of rides and payment.127  They 
maintain control through rating systems.128  However, the form of control 
the courts in both cases focused heavily on was that the rating system 
differs from the control that exists in a traditional business model of a 
company, such as FedEx.  The drivers in the Uber case argued that it is 
different because it does not seek to control every aspect of the worker’s 
performance.129  Looking at the differences between the two business 
models, the rating system in Uber and Lyft could be viewed as a form of 
quality control based on customer feedback.  Uber and Lyft seek to 
continue or discontinue the engagement based on whether customers are 
satisfied.  The on-demand companies rely on customer feedback to ensure 
quality performance.  Under this system, the individuals receiving the 
service—those being transported—have the ability to rate and provide 
feedback.  Once Uber or Lyft receive this feedback, the company responds 
accordingly to maintain quality control over its business, without 
controlling the workers’ performance in a traditional sense. 
Uber and Lyft provide workers flexibility and freedom in some 
important aspects of the work relationship yet maintain control in others.  
This relationship falls into a gray area of employment classification. 
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C. Creating a New Classification: A Hybrid Employee and Independent 
Contractor 
The court in Cotter correctly stated that “the jury in this case will be 
handed a square peg and asked to choose between two round holes.”130  
Nearly all workers in the United States fall into one of two categories: 
employee or independent contractor.  However, these categories seem 
outdated and ill fit with the technological age of on-demand businesses 
run through apps.  In these businesses, where workers seem to cross the 
border of independent contractor and employee, a third category seems 
necessary.  For example, courts and labor and employment statutes in 
Canada and Germany recognize an intermediate class, called the 
“dependent contractor.”131  This relationship forms when a contractor has 
formed an exclusive relationship132 over a period of time with one client, 
and the client therefore becomes economically dependent on the 
relationship.133  While this new worker status that has developed 
demonstrates the workability of new categories of work relationships, it 
does not precisely illustrate the flexible relationships of the on-demand 
economy.  Society is still in need of a category that encompasses 
employees who make a living working for different companies throughout 
their careers, and sometimes working those jobs simultaneously.134 
Seth Harris, a professor at Cornell University, and Alan Krueger a 
professor at Princeton University, have proposed legal reform that could 
provide a possible solution to the ambiguous classification of Uber and 
Lyft drivers.135  Harris and Krueger propose a new classification of 
workers, called the independent workers, who “occupy the gray area 
between [traditional]  employees and independent contractors.”136  In an 
effort to define this new class, Harris and Krueger suggest ideas of what 
protections and benefits these new workers would be provided.  First, 
Harris and Krueger argue that independent workers should be given the 
freedom to organize and collectively bargain.137  They contend that these 
workers should have the ability to bargain over the equivalent of wages, 
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hours, and the terms and conditions of their contractual relationships.138  
Harris and Krueger point out that the main challenge to independent 
workers organizing is the federal anti-trust laws.139  They suggest an 
independent workers’ exemption to anti-trust laws, which would allow the 
workers to have a voice and some ability to influence their relationship.140 
Harris and Krueger also advance that independent workers should be 
included within the protections of federal anti-discrimination statutes.141  
Providing independent workers with protections against discrimination 
could encourage better policy enforcement by Uber and Lyft against racial 
and sexual discrimination.142  Uber would have to administer a new policy 
that not only takes into account the rating system of customers, who may 
discriminate against drivers, causing driver terminations, but possibly also 
co-worker perception. 
Harris and Krueger also suggest allowing intermediary companies, 
such as Uber and Lyft, to opt-in to workers’ compensation without 
transforming the relationship into employment.143  However, Uber and 
Lyft might be better off including workers’ compensation into their 
business model.  Drivers would have a reasonably predictable 
compensation for work related injuries, and Uber144 and Lyft145 could 
avoid costly lawsuits. 
These changes suggested by Harris and Krueger would help to 
protect every Uber and Lyft driver; however, other protections they 
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address may be better aimed at drivers who work for the company in a 
more full-time capacity.  For example, Harris and Krueger assert that 
independent workers should not be eligible for wage and hour protections, 
such as minimum wage, because it is too hard to measure the hours of a 
flexible, independent worker compared to a traditional employee.146   
While it is true that Uber and Lyft drivers work flexible and somewhat 
unpredictable hours, every hour they work is clocked in and out through 
the app.  A better solution might be for Uber to pay minimum wage to 
drivers who work over thirty hours per week.  Uber pays drivers on a 
weekly basis and uses the app to create a payment summary that shows the 
breakdown of all rides.  It would be easy to calculate hours and pay drivers 
minimum wage just by requiring drivers to hit a thirty hour or more limit, 
and then referring to the app to see when that driver worked. 
Another option might be to allow customers to tip Uber and Lyft 
drivers.147  The U.S. Department of Labor does not require employers to 
pay minimum wage to a worker if the amount paid plus tips received 
equals at least the federal minimum wage.148  Currently, Uber’s website 
states that, “tips are not included in the fare, nor are they expected or 
required.”149  Lyft’s website provides instructions of how to tip a driver, 
but the reputation surrounding these platforms is that once the ride is over, 
the fare automatically charged is the final cost.150  If both Uber and Lyft 
promoted tipping drivers, this may change how riders view the experience.  
Then, Uber and Lyft could avoid paying full minimum wage to drivers 
who make it in tips and only make up the difference to those who do not. 
Similarly, health insurance could be distributed to drivers who reach 
the thirty-hour requirement.  However, this presents a problem with 
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maintaining neutrality of independent workers between the 
employer/independent contractor classifications.  Under the Affordable 
Care Act, employers must provide health insurance to employees who 
work thirty hours or more.151  Instead, Harris and Krueger propose that 
intermediary companies pay a contribution equal to five percent out of 
independent workers’ earnings to go towards health insurance tax 
subsidies.152 
A new classification for the on-demand workforce could clear up 
ambiguities for courts that have previously attempted to pigeonhole these 
workers into the employee/independent contractor category.  However, it 
is a lengthy conversation and one that would take years before 
implementation.  The courts cannot create this new category of workers 
on their own, and, therefore, it will be left to the legislatures to provide a 
workable solution.  In the meantime, the ongoing lawsuits within the Ninth 
Circuit probably will not force Uber and Lyft to change their business 
models.  Uber and Lyft are entirely constructed around their flexible 
drivers and independent contractor model.  The cases, as of now, are 
limited to California drivers.  These drivers are up against multi-million 
dollar companies, so any damages they win will matter little in the general 
scheme of things.153  However, if the lawsuits spread, both on-demand 
companies and the legislature will need to consider a new solution to fit 
the needs of a changing economy. 
Uber and Lyft could potentially change their business models to 
make the drivers employees.  However, if the drivers were to become 
employees they may lose the flexibility that attracts many of them to the 
ride-share companies in the first place.154  As it stands, Uber and Lyft 
drivers have control over when and how often they work.  They are free to 
work other full-time jobs and still drive for Uber whenever the opportunity 
arises.155  As employees, the employer would control their schedules.156  
The convenience that results to the driver from freedom to drive whenever 
and however they like would be lost.157  Drivers who treat the job as a full-
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time job would benefit from this, but the many other drivers who do not 
would suffer.158  Uber would likely compensate for rising labor costs by 
taking a larger cut in fares and decreasing its workforce.159  As we address 
possible solutions to the on-demand dichotomy and ways to better protect 
worker interests, we must keep in mind that many workers are interested 
in preserving the flexibility and freedom that first attracted them to Uber 
and Lyft. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The recent Uber and Lyft cases provide insight into the outdated 
employment classification test in California in light of the changing 
economy.  However, on a broader scale it raises issues about what benefits 
and protections workers are entitled to when they are not an employee or 
independent contractor, but something in between.  Ultimately, creating a 
new category of workers could strengthen the on-demand workforce and 
clear ambiguity among courts that have wrestled with these employment 
relationships. 
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